SMU Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 4

Article 2

January 1975

True Consignment under the Uniform Commercial Code, and
Related Peccadilloes, The
Peter Winship
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law

Recommended Citation
Peter Winship, True Consignment under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Related Peccadilloes, The, 29
SW L.J. 825 (1975)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol29/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

THE "TRUE" CONSIGNMENT UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, AND RELATED PECCADILLOES
by
Peter Winship*
Professor Gilmore: As Article 9 reads, we leave it more or less to the
courts to determine whether a particular consignment was not backed
by security interest or was. We don't cover all consignments, necessarily.
Mr. Ireton: I mean, the true consignment was intended to be covered
by Article 9.

Professor Gilmore: I am not sure what you have in mind by 'a true
consignment."
Marketing patterns change: the independent, small-town horse trader
becomes the new-car dealer with a franchise from a national automobile
manufacturer. Populations grow, technology develops, communications improve, consumer demands shift, banking facilities spread, and credit financing policies change. Legal rules may also influence marketing patterns as
lawyers are accepted as business advisers and communicate to businessmen
the legal rules regulating directly or indirectly the marketing of goods.
Distributing goods through commission agents, for example, is no longer as
important a marketing device as it was one hundred years ago. 2 Along the
western frontier and in the agricultural south the commission agent or factor
was an essential middleman in the distribution and exchange of agricultural
and manufactured produce.3 'Producers consigned goods to the agent who
* B.A., LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., University of London. Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. Hearing Before Enlarged EditorialBoard, January 27-29, 1951, 6 Bus. LAw. 164,
193 (1951). The Board's discussion of consignments under article 2 appears in id. at

192-94. It should be read with the caution that the text of

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE § 2-326 (1951 version) was later amended. See note 29 infra. The hearing
clearly indicates that the draftsmen themselves were not in full agreement on the definition of the "true" consignment. In the course of discussion the following definitions
were suggested. Ireton: "[A true consignment is a] regular consignment contract
where it is purely an agency arrangement, not intended as security, although in its economic incidence it is a security." Kripke: "The Reporters have been consistent in saying that if someone agrees to buy some goods, until he pays that is on consignment ...
If there is no obligation to pay, it is a true consignment and not under Article 9, and
falls under only 326." Braucher: "Under the present law sometimes you have a disguised security transaction going under the name of consignment. That would be covered under Article 9. In other cases you have a regular agency arrangement which 2326 as it now stands would invalidate unless there were a sign law, or you complied
with this general knowledge provision which I don't thoroughly understand. For those
transactions-the true agency case-I wanted to provide a procedure for validation."
Hearing, supra, at 193.
2. For a brief, stimulating history of the factor as a middleman in the United
States, see Steffen & Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor, 36 COLuM. L.
REv.745 (1936).
3. The importance of the commission agent for the nineteenth century economy
is eloquently expressed by a Texas court in Mills v. Johnston, 23 Tex. 309 (1850):
The commission business is the creature of agriculture and commerce,
and has grown up in all the great centers of trade throughout the United
States. The commission merchant finds his proper and necessary place
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would sell this produce and remit the sale price to the producers less a
commission. Both common law rules and remedial legislation favored the
consignment arrangement: the factor had a common law lien on the
principal's goods while in his possession to secure advances made to the
principal; legislation protected the third party who purchased in good faith
from the factor. 4 One hundred years later the consignment transaction,
while still important, is no longer as common. The frontier has passed,
transportation has improved, communications are speedier, population centers have grown in size. Legal rules have no doubt had an impact on the
business of the commission agent. The most obvious example of this impact
is the growth of the large, mobile corporation as a combination of men and
capital which could purchase and market through its own employees. Less
dramatically, the changes in private commercial law and the introduction of
antitrust and bankruptcy legislation have influenced consignment marketing.
In the area of private commercial law the key concepts in the consignment
transaction were simple. The owner or title-holder of the goods gave
possession of the goods to an agent or bailee for sale, who would sell the
goods to third persons and remit the proceeds to the owner-principal less the
agreed-upon commission. On the sale to the third party, title passed
directly from the owner-principal to the third party. "Agency" rules
governed the authority of the agent and the rights and obligations of both
principal and agent. Location of "title" resolved disputes over such matters
as risk of loss and the rights of the agent's creditors. True, the purity of the
consignment device was contaminated sometimes by the use of the consignment as a disguised conditional sale to avoid the public filing required by
conditional sales laws. But if you kept in mind the "true" basic concepts you
could solve most problems. 5
Twentieth-century scholarly disillusion with the concept of title in commercial law is well known. As a leading proponent of "realism" in commercial law Karl Llewellyn first attacked "title" in the law journals6 and then, as
between the farmer or planter, who tills the soil, and produces crops, and
those by whom the productions of the earth are manufactured or consumed. To state that this kind of business is necessary to agriculture and
commerce, is at the same time to state that the laws of the country extend
their protection to it.
Id. at 324. See also the opinion of Taney, C.J., in Gibson v. Stevens, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
384, 399 (1850).
4. For a review of the common law lien and the early Factors Acts see S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS §§ 317-23 (1st ed. 1909).
The second
(1924) and revised (1948) editions of this standard work are less comprehensive with
respect to the historical material. For a mid-nineteenth century summary of the law by
another eminent authority, see W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 74-92 (2d ed. 1853).
5. Rio Grande Oil Co. v. Miller Rubber Co., 31 Ariz. 84, 250 P. 564, 565 (1926),
is often quoted: "[A] consignment of goods for sale does not pass title at any time,
nor does it contemplate that it should be passed. The very term implies an agency, and
the title is in consignor, the consignee being his agent." F. TIFFANY, LAW OF SALES
11 n.54 (2d ed. rev. 1908) suggests one exception to the above analysis: "Where goods
are consigned on such terms that the consignee is at liberty to sell on such terms as
he sees fit, but must in such case pay the consignor at fixed prices, until a sale is made
the property remains in the consignor, but when he sells the property passes to him,
and he sells on his own account, and not as agent."
6, See Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N,YU.L.Q. 159
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Chief Reporter in the preparation of the Uniform Commercial Code, drafted
provisions which replaced title as a general concept with more specific rules
allocating risks at different steps in the course of a commercial transaction.
Not only sales law but also the law of secured commercial transactions came
under the influence of this skepticism about "lump" concepts. 7
Under the circumstances, marketing by consignment could hardly avoid
the influence of Code thinking. Functionally, the consignment is in many
cases very similar to the "sale or return" or to inventory financing. As one
court, writing in 1939, pointed out: "It is not readily apparent why any
consignment arrangement is not a secret lien against creditors of a shaky
consignee, as harmful as an unfiled chattel mortgage or conditional sale."'8
The Code draftsmen, therefore, provided for the consignment at various
places in the Code. Commentators and courts have struggled with these
provisions and the Code draftsmen themselves have amended and supplemented them in the subsequent official texts of the UCC. Confusion remains,
however, especially with respect to the relation of article 2 (sales) provisons
to those in article 9 (secured transactions). Nor is the question of academic
interest only. The interpretation of one commentator led another to deplore
the academic hostility to the consignment as a flexible marketing device. 9
In this Article I focus on the Uniform Commercial Code rules regulating
consignments. I first set out the legislative history of these rules-an instructive story in itself-and place them in the context of the related rules
governing the "sale on approval" and the "sale or return." I then comment
on the consignment rules themselves, with emphasis on the relation of article
2 provisions to those in article 9. I do not discuss recent antitrust developments, which have had a considerable impact on marketing by consignment,
as others have commented on these developments. 10
(1938); Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARv. L. REV. 725 (1939); Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. REv. 873 (1939).

7. The genesis and jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, with special
emphasis on the role of Llewellyn, are well-analyzed in W. TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270-340 (1973).
8. Liebowitz v. Voiello, 107 F.2d 914, 916 (2d Cir. 1939). The court goes on
to state:
We do not see how the behavior of the parties could have been very different had the arrangement been one of outright or conditional sale. It is
neither easy nor practical to say where a consignment ends and a sale begins. In the light of the Ludvigh case [Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co.,
231 U.S. 522 (1913)], however, there is a line to be drawn. When the
rights and duties created by the contract (as actually performed) are substantially the same as the rights and duties that would be created by a sale,
the arrangement must be deemed a sale. The asserted intent of the parties
that there be a consignment and not a sale cannot prevail when, as here,
the rights of creditors intervene.
Id. at 916-17.
9. Duesenberg, Consignments under the UCC: A Comment on Emerging Principles, 26 Bus. LAW. 565 (1970), deploring the views of Professor Hawkland as expressed in Hawkland, Consignments Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Sales or
Security?, UCC CO-ORDINATOR ANN. 395 (1963); Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 COM. L.J. 146 (1962). See the discussion of the
views of these authors at notes 81-94 infra and accompanying text.
10. See Duesenberg, Consignment Distribution Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: Code, Bankruptcy and Antitrust Considerations, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 227,
243-53 (1967). The older antitrust cases distinguished the "true" from the "false" consignment, permitting consignor in a true agency consignment to fix the prices of "his"
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CONSIGNMENTS IN CONTEXT

A.

Legislative History

The evolution of the Code texts referring to consignments illustrates not
only the draftsmen's ambivalence to consignments but also the process by
which the Code grew by accretion as it went through layer on layer of
advisory and legislative committees. The legislative history also explains
some anomalies noted by courts, although how much weight a given court
will place on this form of explanation when interpreting the promulgated text
is problematical."
As an agency arrangement, the consignment was outside the scope of the
Uniform Sales Act of 1906 and the Act made no reference to the consignment transaction. The Act did, however, set out rules of interpretation for
the sale or return and sale on approval' 2 which the Act borrowed with
goods on sale by consignee. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926);
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For an acid comment on the reasoning of these cases, see Klaus, Sale, Agency and Price Maintenance
(pts. I, II), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 441 (1928).
More recent cases have been much
harsher with the consignment device as a price-fixing mechanism.
United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964); United States v. General Electric Co., 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In
the Simpson case Justice Douglas stated:
Here we have an antitrust policy expressed in Acts of Congress. Accordingly, a consignment, no matter how lawful it might be as a matter of private contract law, must give way before the federal antitrust policy ...
When . . . a 'consignment' device is used to cover a vast gasoline distribution system, fixing prices through many retail outlets, the antitrust laws
prevent calling the 'consignment' an agency, for then the end result . . .
would be avoided merely by clever manipulation of words, not by differences in substance. The present, coercive 'consignment' device, if successful against challenge under the antitrust laws, furnishes a wooden formula
for administering prices on a vast scale.
377 U.S. at 18, 21-22. Relying on the Simpson decision, the federal district court in
the recent General Electric case held that the consignment arrangement upheld in the
1926 decision had been overruled by Simpson. 358 F. Supp. at 738. Comments on
these cases have proliferated. See, e.g., Rahl, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-A Study in Antitrust Analysis, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1966).
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3)(g) (1952 version) stated: "Prior
drafts of text and comments may not be used to ascertain legislative intent." The 1957
official text omitted this provision. The reader should note the comment in R. SPEIDEL,
R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW

44 (2d ed. 1974):
It will have to be left to the Supreme Court of the United States to rule
out the use of prior versions of sections and comments as an unconstitutional form of cruel and inhuman punishment of fellow lawyers. Or perhaps the decisive argument will be that because of their scarcity (only a
few libraries have them) their use denies equal protection of the laws.
12. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 19, rule 3 (1906 version) stated:
Rules for Ascertaining Intention. Unless a different intention appears,
the following are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to
the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer. ...
Rule 3. (1) When goods are delivered to the buyer 'on sale or return,'
or on other terms indicating an intention to make a present sale, but to
give the buyer an option to return the goods instead of paying the price,
the property passes to the buyer on delivery, but he may revest the property in the seller by returning or tendering the goods within the time fixed
in the contract, or, if no time has been fixed, within a reasonable time.
(2) When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or on trial or on
satisfaction, or other similar terms, the property therein passes to the
buyer(a) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or does
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amendments from the British Sale of Goods Act, 1893 .1 Section 19, rule 3
distinguished between these two special sales transactions by reference to the
passage of title. In a sale or return title passed immediately as in an ordinary
sale, but the buyer had the option to return the goods instead of paying the
price; whereas in a sale on approval title passed only when the buyer
accepted the goods after trial. Who had title determined such problems as
who bore the risk of loss as spelled out elsewhere in the Act.
When revision of the Uniform Sales Act began the draftsmen not only
suggested redrafting in functional terms the rules of interpretation for the
sale or return and the sale on approval but also the need to clarify the
"whole 'memorandum' situation, including the 'consignment' and 'conditional
sale for resale' phases."' 14 The first published Report and Second Draft of
the Revised Uniform Sales Act commented:
This subsection [section 19, rule 3] was peculiar, in the Act of 1906, in
giving no indication on what facts operated to produce one or the other
result, although the rest of this section is devoted to that end. The added
clauses serve this need, in accordance with practice. But no clause
has been added to help distinguish a 'sale or return' from a 'consignment.' In regard to that, a presumption in favor of 'sale or return'

needs adding. Both the memorandum and the bookkeeping entries are
commonly-and often intentionally-ambiguous; risk rests properly
(and often expressly) on the buyer-or-consignee in possession; accounting or return within a fixed time, at a fixed price, is a normal requirement, either way; but consignment is not to be favored, as
against the trustee in bankruptcy of a buyer-or-consignee; the older
use of consignment to maintain prices is no longer necessary; and the
inconvenience of cutting off essential warranties to consumers if the
goods pass through a chain of 'sales,' is avoided by Section 16-B. 15

The text of a provision on consignments was first published in the
Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (April 27, 1944)."' Although the specific
wording was revised, this draft text established the basic pattern of the
present official text: (a) if the person receiving the goods to be sold meets
certain criteria, (b) the goods in his possession will be subject to the claims
of his creditors (c) notwithstanding a purported reservation of title (d)
unless the person delivering the goods does something to remove the
transaction from the scope of the Code section. The text stated:
any other act adopting the transaction:
(b) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the seller but
retains the goods without giving notice of rejection, then if a time has
been fixed for the return of the goods, on the expiration of such time,
and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time.
What is a reasonable time is a question of fact.
13. Sale of Goods Act of 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, § 18, Rule 3. The British Act
does not distinguish the sale on approval from the sale or return, both being considered
as reserving title in the seller until buyer accepts. J. BENJAMIN, SALE OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY 335-42 (7th ed. A. Kennedy 1931).
14. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws
[NCCUSL], THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT: REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT 135
(1941).
15. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
16. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE [AL], UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (SALES CHAPTER OF PROPOSED COMMERCIAL CODE): PROPOSES FINAL DRAFT No. 1, §§ 51-52 (April
27, 1944).
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Between merchants there is a contract for sale or return when goods
are delivered to the buyer for resale and are charged at a fixed price
but even though they conform to the contract are returnable against
recredit or repayment of their price in full or less minor charges. In
determining whether a contract constitutes as against creditors of the
buyer a sale or return, the use of such words as 'on consignment' or 'on
memorandum' with or without words purporting to reserve title or
property in the seller until payment or resale does not prevent the
contract from being a sale or return if the buyer has a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, unless the seller
establishes that the buyer
is known to be engaged primarily in selling
7
the goods of others.1
In the same draft text the provisions on the sale or return and the sale on
approval set out the special incidents followed in the present official text, but
the draft continued to distinguish the two transactions by reference to
location of title.' 5
With minor revisions and renumbering the 1944 text was carried over to
the first composite draft of the proposed Code in 1948 and to the May 1949
draft. 19 The latter edition introduced extensive comments which, with minor
revisions, appear as the official comments to the present promulgated text20
despite subsequent revision of that text.
Meanwhile, references to consignments began to crop up in other parts of
the proposed Commercial Code. The draftsmen of the article governing
17. Id.§ 51(2).
18. Id.§ 51(1):
A 'sale on approval' is a contract for sale under which the goods delivered,
notwithstanding such use by the buyer as is consistent with their testing
or trying out, are to remain the seller's until acceptance by the buyer. A
'sale or return' is a contract for sale under which the goods even though
they conform to the contract and have been accepted by the buyer are
subject to return at his option.
The word "and" in the second sentence is changed to "or" in the 1948 and following
drafts. Query whether "and" does not make better theoretical sense?
19. ALI & NCCUSL, THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW § 50(2) (1948) amends the
second sentence of the 1944 draft of § 51(2) to read:
Where the buyer has a place of business at which he deals in goods of the
kind involved, such words as 'on consignment' or 'on memorandum' or
other words purporting to reserve title to the seller until payment or resale
are insufficient as against the buyer's creditors to keep the transaction
from being a sale or return unless the seller also establishes that the buyer
is known to be primarily engaged in selling the goods of others.

ALI & NCCUSL,

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:

MAY 1949 DRAFT wrrH COMMENTS

(1949) renumbers these sections as §§ 2-326 and 2-327.
20. The official comments to the present official text of sections 2-326 and 2-327
adopt the May 1949 comments with the following minor exceptions: (a) Official comment 2 to section 2-326, in the third sentence, adds references to compliance with a relevant sign law or with the filing provisions of article 9. (b) Official comment I to section 2-327 adds the third sentence but omits a first and third paragraphs which appear
in the May 1949 comment:
Appropriation of the goods to the contract occurs upon identification.
The effect of the appropriation as provided for in this Article applies in
this case as in any other.
ihe"return of the goods in a sale on approval is at the seller's risk and
expense but the buyer must follow the seller's instructions as to this return. The policy of the Article in regard to the buyer's duties in this connection conforms to that set forth in the provision on the buyer's duties as
to rightfully rejected goods.
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secured commercial transactions and of the definitions in the general intro-

ductory article wrestled with the classification of consignments. In so far as
the rights of third parties were concerned Tentative Draft No. 2 of August 6,
1948, which covered inventory and accounts receivable financing, specifically included within its scope the consignment of goods "whether or not the
consignee is obligated to the consignor."'2 1 The May 1949 draft of this scope
provision is even more explicit and the draft adds a section specifically

governing consignments. This latter provision distinguishes the "true" from
the "false" consignment: "If the effect of a consignment is to require the
consignee to pay all or a major part of the price of the goods whether or not
he disposes of such goods, the consignment is deemed an inventory lien and
is subject to this Part in all respects." '22 In other words, if the transaction is a
disguised security transaction, then the article on secured transactions applies
in full and the sales article does not apply; if not a disguised security
transaction, then the article on secured transactions does not apply except
that a consignor "has the privilege of complying with filing provisions but
such action does not make the other sections applicable. ' 23 The draftsmen
21. ALI & NCCUSL, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2: ARTICLE VII-SECURED COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 301(2) (b) (Aug. 6, 1948) stated: "The provisions of this Chapter
also govern . . . (b) with respect to rights of third parties, a consignment of goods
whether or not the consignee is obligated to the consignor." The comment to this provision, which appears in the notes and comments to the tentative draft published on the
same date, gives the following reason for including § 301(2) (b):
'Consignment,' whether or not the consignee is obligated to pay for the
goods, presents the same evils as far as third persons are concerned as a
sale and a lien on the goods. In both, the consignee or borrower appears
to have assets which he does not have. Many states by their statutes or
otherwise, require notice of consignments in the same way as they do for
mortgages on goods. This provision continues that policy.
ALl & NCCUSL, NOTES AND COMMENTS TO TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2: ARTICLE VIISECURED COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 301, Comment 5 (Aug. 6, 1948).
22. ALI & NCCUSL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT WITH COMMENTS § 7-304(2) (1949). Id. § 7-304(1) states:
Save as provided in subsection (2), the rights of a consignor against persons dealing with the consignee are subject to the provisions of the Article
on Sales on sale on approval and sale or return (Section 2-326) except
that a consignor of goods shall be deemed to have met the requirements of
those provisions that the seller establish that the buyer is known to be primarily engaged in selling goods of others if he files a statement of financing as required under the provisions of this Part on filing (Sections 7-306
and 7-307).
The Comment to this section provides:
Purposes:
1. The provisions of the Article on Sales on sale on approval and sale or
return provide that a consignee's creditors may reach the consigned goods
in his hands unless the consignor can establish that the buyer is known to
be engaged in selling the goods of others. Subsection (1) permits the
consignor to meet his burden of proof by filing a statement of financing
under this Part (Sections 7-306 and 7-307).
2. Some consignments are disguised security transactions. The generally
accepted test is whether the consignee is obligated to pay for the goods
whether or not he disposes of them. Where the consignment is in reality
a security transaction, then all the provisions of this Part govern. If the
consignment is not a security transaction, none of the provisions of this
Part apply. The consignor has the privilege of complying with filing provisions but such action does not make the other sections applicable.
23. ALI & NCCUSL, Noms AND COMMENTS TO TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2:
ARTICLE VII-SEURED COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 7-304, Comment 2 (Aug. 6,
1948).
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were too sanguine or too explicit. The September 1949 revisions include
consignments within the general definition of the scope of the article on
secured transactions but quietly drop the detailed provision on consign24
ments.
At the same time draft texts defining a "security interest" recognized that
reservation of title by a consignor is analogous to the more explicit secured
financing arrangement. The text set out in the Code of Commercial Law
(1948) states:
'Security Interest' means an interest in goods or documents of title
which is limited to securing a payment or performance by another
person. A security interest which rests on the reservation by a seller
or consignor of property or title notwithstanding appropriation of
goods to a contract
25 for sale or notwithstanding shipment or delivery
is a 'security title.'
With minor amendments this text was carried over into the first official Code
26
text.
When, in 1952, the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of State Commissioners on Uniform State Laws finally promulgated the first
official edition of the Uniform Commercial Code the text included the
following references to consignments: (a) section 1-201(37) defined "security interest" with a reference to the consignor; (b) section 2-326(2) [now
(3)] assimilated a consignment to the sale or return; and (c) the comment
to section 9-102 noted that the scope of the article included transactions in
the form of consignments "if the understanding of the parties or the effect of
'27
the arrangement shows that a security interest was intended.
24. ALI & NCCUSL, SEPTEMBER 1949 REVISIONS § 8-102 (1949). Comment 1 to
this section states:
The test whether a transaction comes under this Article or not is twofold:
Is the transaction intended to have effect as security? Is the collateral of
the kind subject to this Article? . . . Transactions in the form of consignments or leases may be security transactions if the understanding of the
parties or the effect of the arrangement is to show that the manifest intent
was to create a security interest (defined in Section 1-201(30)).
25. ALI & NCCUSL, THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW § 12(4) (1948). For
earlier definitions see UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 1 (1933) (also drafted by
Llewellyn); NCCUSL, THE

REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT:

REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT

§ 1 (1941); ALI,

UNIFORM REVISED SALES AT
(SALES CHAPTER OF PROPOSED COMMERCIAL CODE): PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT NO. 1,§ 12(4) (April 27, 1944).
26. ALI & NCCUSL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PROPOSED FINAL DRATr No.

2 TEXT EDITION § 1-201(37) (1951) reads:

'Security Interest' means an interest inproperty which secures payment or
performance of an obligation. The reservation by a seller or consignor of
property notwithstanding identification of goods to a contract for sale or
notwithstanding shipment or delivery is a 'security interest.'
The draftsmen of article 9 had also included in that article definitions of "inventory
lien" and "security interest" but the definition disappeared in the September 1950 draft.
See ALI & NCCUSL, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. I: Article VII--Secured Commercial
Transactions § 2(1) (April 21, 1948); TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2: Article VI--Secured
Commercial Transactions §§ 302(1), (3) (August 6, 1948); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT WITH COMMENTS § 7-103 (1949); SEPTEMBER 1949 REVISIONS
§ 8-105 (1949); OCTOBER 1949 REVISIONS § 8-104 (1949); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT-TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION § 9-105(1) (h) (Spring 1950);
SEPTEMBER 1950 REVISIONS OF ARTICLE 2, ARTICLE 4 AND ARTICLE 9 (1950).
27. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(37), 2-326(2), 9-102, Comment 1
(1952 version).

1975]

CONSIGNMENT

Submitted to state legislatures for their consideration, the text was the
subject of searching criticism, most notably from the New York Law
Revision Commission. One of the memoranda submitted to the New York
Commission noted a number of inconsistencies in the texts referring to
consignments. Whereas pre-Code doctrine carefully distinguished the consignee-agent, who took no title to goods on consignment from the buyer of
goods, Code section 2-326(2) [now(3)] spoke of "buyers" taking "on
consignment." The memorandum noted that a narrow interpretation of the
provision would give it little effect and that a broad interpretation, which
would allow the consignor to escape its provisions by complying with one of
three forms of publicity, might conflict with section 1-201(37) which defined
a consignor's interest as a security interest subject to article 9.28 The New
York Commission's final report called attention to these inconsistencies,
stated that the Commission approved "[t]he principle of requiring that a
consignor who consigns goods to an agent who maintains a place of business
at which he deals in goods of the kind involved comply with Article 9 or
satisfy one of the other two [notoriety] requirements," and set out a draft text
of the first three subsections of section 2-326 which the Commission recom29
mended for adoption.
In light of comments such as those from the New York Commission, the
Code's Enlarged Editorial Board recommended numerous changes to the
1952 text. In Supplement No. 1 published in January 1955 the Board
recommended amendments to section 9-102(2) to include specifically "consignments intended as security," and to section 1-201(37) to "make it clear
that a true consignment . . .is not a secured transaction subject to all the

filing, priority and enforcement provisions of Article 9."30 With minor
amendments, these proposals and the text of section 2-326 recommended by
the New York Commission were promulgated in the 1957 offical edition of
28. 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, at 43642 (1956). For another comment on the relation of § 1-201(37) with § 2-326 see id.
at 295.
29. REPORT OF THE NEW YoRK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956, at 379-80
(1957). The text of § 2-326(3) proposed by the New York Commission has become
the official text except that in the first sentence the word "When" is changed to "Where"
and in the third sentence the following amendments are made:
However, this subsection is not applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an [any] applicable law providing for [requiring] a
consignor's interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally
known [or holds himself out] by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c)complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9).
(Deletions in the official text are indicated by brackets; additions by the official text
are indicated by italics.)
30. ALI & NCCUSL, SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT
AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, CoNTAINING FURTHER REcoMMENDATIONS OF THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD FOR AMENDMENTS OF TEXT AND

1-201(37), 9-102(2) (Jan. 1955). Among other
recommendations the Board proposed the following amendments to § 1-201(37) with respect to consignments: omission in the second sentence of the phrase "or consignor
of property" and the addition of a third sentence to read: "Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a 'security interest'
but a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions of section 2-326(2)."
ANSWERS TO CERTAIN CRITICISMS §§
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the Uniform Commercial Code and remain the official text today. States
adopting the Code have made no changes, with one insignificant exception,
to these Code rules governing consignments. 8'
More recently, the 1972 amendments to article 9 have added two sections
to article 9 specifically referring to consignments. In its Preliminary Report
No. 2 (1970) the Review Committee for Article 9 recommended a draft
section 9-114 to resolve doubt as to whether or not a consignor could protect
his interest in consigned goods against creditors of the consignee by merely
filing under article 9 or whether he must also notify prior inventory secured
parties. 82 The Permanent Editorial Board and the sponsoring bodies not only
approved this recommendation but also recommended inclusion of section 9408 to set out the mechanics of filing a consignment statement to avoid any
presumption that a consignment is intended for security by the mere fact of
filing under article 9.83 So far fourteen states have adopted these 1972
amendments without change.
B.

84

Sale on Approval

A "sale on approval" under the Uniform Commercial Code is a special
form of contract for sale.8 5 It differs from a regular contract for sale in that
(a) the buyer in a sale on approval takes goods primarily for use, whereas a
buyer in a regular sale is not so limited; (b) the buyer on approval may
return the goods after trial even if they fully conform to the contract
description, whereas a buyer normally has a right of inspection but a right to
reject only if the goods are nonconforming; and (c) the sale on approval is
subject to the special incidents set out in section 2-327(1) which differ from
those of a regular contract for sale. Like the consignment, the sale on approval transfers possession of the goods from the owner to the other party to the
transaction and that other party has the right to return the goods to the
owner and, thus, relieve himself from any obligation with respect to the
goods. The sale on approval differs from a consignment, however, in that the
goods on approval are not subject to the claims of buyer's creditors while in
31. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-326(3) (a), which permits consignor to avoid
subsection (3) by complying with an applicable sign law, is omitted in the California

enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code because California has no sign law and
it was felt that the reference "might create confusion." CAL. COMM. CODE ANN. § 2326,
California Code Comment 5 (1964).
32. REVIEW CoMMirEE FOR ARTICLE 9, PRELIMINARY REPORT No. 2, § 9-114
(1970). The text is also published in 25 Bus. LAW. 1067, 1117-18 (1970). The official
1972 text of the Code changes the word "debtor" to "consignee" in §§ 9-114(1)(a), (c)

and (d), but otherwise adopts the Review Committee's text without change. The official

text does add paragraph 4 to § 9-114, Comment 1. [The 1972 official text of the Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be cited as UCC. All other drafts will be so
designated]. See Anderson, Proposed Section 9-114 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
The Consignor's Priority in his Goods, 8 LOYOLA OF L.A.L. REv. 139 (1975).
33. UCC §§ 9-114, 9-408.

34. For a brief discussion of the "sale on approval," with emphasis on the historical

and comparative perspective, see Murray, Sale or Return and Sale on Approval of Goods,
1962 Wis. L. REV. 93.
35. UCC § 2-326, Comment 1, [ 3 observes that the section "nevertheless presupposes that a contract for sale is contemplated by the parties although that contract may
be of the peculiar character here described,"
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his possession (section 2-326(2)), whereas consigned goods are subject to
the claims of consignee's creditors if the consignment falls within the scope of
section 2-326(3). Examples of a sale on approval included the manufacturer
who takes a machine on trial and the housewife who takes home a dress to
test its effect on her husband.
The provisions governing the sale on approval have generated remarkably
little litigation and commentary.a Perhaps even more than in the ordinary
sale between merchants, the sale on approval to a merchant or a nonmerchant consumer puts pressure on the parties to negotiate. The seller
realizes he is gambling that a demonstration of the goods will persuade the
customer to accept. Also, the period of trial allows for adjustments both to
the goods and the deal by the seller, who may hope that with a foot in the
door he can still make a sale.
Most of the specific rules in sections 2-326 and 2-327 with respect to the
sale on approval codify prior law.37 Traditionally, many of the rules were
explained by reference to seller's retention of title until buyer accepted. The
buyer's creditors had no claims to the goods until acceptance; seller had the
risk of loss until acceptance; if buyer elected to return the goods the seller
bore the risk and expense of the return of "his" goods. The Code adopts
these rules and, oddly enough, considering the de-emphasis on "title" in the
Code generally, notes that title does not pass to buyer until acceptance,
although the Code makes nothing turn on the retention of title.38
In theory perhaps the most difficult rule to justify is the rule that creditors
of the buyer have no claims to the goods in buyer's possession until
acceptance. In other contexts, for example the consignment, the law is eager
to protect the creditors of a person who has ostensible ownership of goods by
virtue of his possession of them. Here, not only does buyer have possession,
but by definition he is using the goods or trying them out. In practice this
may not raise many problems because the trial period will be relatively short
and the process of testing may itself call attention to the buyer's limited
rights. In one recently reported case where seller and creditor of the buyer
both claimed the goods in buyer's possession, the court found that buyer had
accepted the goods by the lapse of two months without exercising his election
to return them and, therefore, the creditor's claims to the goods prevailed. 89
36. See 1 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-326,
-327 (2d ed. 1970); R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE
U.C.C., 3A BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 11.05 (1974). See also
Murray, supra note 34.
37. For a summary of pre-Code law see L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES
381-87 (2d ed. 1959); 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS §§ 270-

73 (rev. ed. 1948).
38. UCC § 2-327(1)(a).
39. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 1035
(Utah 1974). See also Akron Brick & Block Co. v. Moniz Engineering Co., 310 N.E.2d

128, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 563 (Mass. 1974), where Mr. Justice Braucher, who when a

professor had been active in drafting the Code, found that there had been an acceptance
under the facts of that case whether the contract was a contract for sale or a sale on
approval. Under the contract terms, the seller remained the owner until the price was
fully paid, but if the machine did not meet the approval of the buyer, seller agreed to
"refund the down payment, including Engineering charges."
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C. Sale or Return40
A "sale or return" under the Uniform Commericial Code is a regular
contract for sale with the special feature that the buyer has the option to
return the goods in lieu of payment even if they conform to the contract. The
buyer takes the goods primarily for resale and is, therefore, in most cases a
merchant. 41 Functionally, the sale or return is like the consignment in that it
places goods in the hands of a retailer who has the power to return unsold
goods. Recognizing the similarity of the two marketing forms, the Code
draftsmen assimilated the consignment to the sale or return with respect to
the claims of retailer's creditors to the goods while in retailer's possession.
The Code, however, prescribes additional rules for the sale or return. 42
General sales provisions apply to the sale or return except for the special
rules which follow from the option to return. The risk of loss will be
allocated between the seller and buyer in accordance with the general rules
set out in section 2-509, but, unless otherwise agreed, the buyer will bear the
risk of loss and expense when exercising his option to return the goods
pursuant to section 2-327(2)(b). While the goods are in buyer's possession
they are subject to the claims of his creditors in accordance with section 2326(2). After making delivery the seller cannot unilaterally reclaim the
goods. Most of these rules follow pre-Code law, which explained them
doctrinally by locating title in the buyer. 43
The Code makes some changes from prior law. The draftsmen considered
the "or return" term as so contrary to commercial practice that section 2326(4) treats the term as a separate contract for the purposes of the statute
of frauds and as contradicting the sale aspect for the purposes of the parol
evidence rule. As a result, where written contracts are involved the agreement permitting the return of conforming goods must be in writing. 44 In
40. See 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 36, §§ 2-326, -327; R. DUESENBERG & L. KING,
supra note 36, § 11.04; Murray, supra note 34.
41. UCC § 2-326, Comment 1 notes that the sale or return transaction is "so
strongly delineated in practice and in general understanding that every presumption runs
against a delivery to a consumer being a 'sale or return.'"
42. Confusion between the "sale or return" and the consignment transaction
"deemed" a sale or return "with respect to claims of [consignee's] creditors" under UCC
§ 2-326(3) plagues analysis. This confusion mars, for example, the stimulating analysis
in Comment, Consignments ,and Similar Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1210-13 (1968). Several court decisions do note the
distinction. In re A & T Kwik-N-Handi, Inc., 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 779 (M.D. Ga.
1973); American Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 476 P.2d 304, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 287
(Colo. Ct. App. 1970). The court in the latter case states:
'Sale or return' under subsection (1) [of section 2-326] is not defined in
the Code. However, a 'sale or return' transaction is not a new concept in
Colorado law. A 'sale or return' is a contract for sale or [sic] goods
whereby title passes immediately to the buyer subject to his option to rescind or return the goods if he does not resell them. . . . Section 2-326

(2) provides that goods held on sale or return are subject to the claims of
the buyer's creditors while such goods are in the buyer's possession. The
exceptions set forth in subsection (3), (a), (b), (c) apply only to transactions covered by subsection (3) and do not apply to a sale or return under subsection (1).
Id. at 309, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. at 289.

43. L. VOLD, supra note 37, at 381-87; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 37, § 270-73.
44. UCC § 2-326, Comment 3. For Professor Williston's adverse comment on this
change see Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63
HARv. L. REV. 561, 580 (1950).
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some jurisdictions title revested in the seller when buyer delivered to a
carrier for shipment to the seller; in resolving the conflict in prior law, the
Code requires the actual return of goods to the seller before the buyer is
45
relieved of his obligations.
A more basic change, however, is in the conceptual distinction between
the sale on approval and the sale or return. Under pre-Code law the
distinction turned on whether or not the seller intended to part with title;
whether the buyer purchased for use or for resale made no legal difference.
Early drafts of section 2-326(1) set out a functional distinction, but also
differentiated the two transactions in terms of ownership:
A 'sale on approval' is a contract for sale under which the goods
delivered, notwithstanding such use by the buyer as is consistent with
their testing or trying out, are ,to remain the seller's until acceptance
by the buyer. A 'sale or return' is a contract for sale under which
the goods even though they conform to the contract 4or
have been ac0
cepted by the buyer are subject to return at his option.
Commenting on this draft, a memorandum to the New York Law Revision
Commission pointed out that here the intent of the parties as to location of
title remained important, whereas in most of the Code "title" is downplayed. 47 In its final report the New York Commission recommended the
distinction which now appears as section 2-326(1) and which abandons
48
location of title as a test.
According to the official comment to section 2-326, the transaction
originally contemplated by the draftsmen is where the seller overcomes the
unwillingness of a merchant to risk marketing the goods by giving the buyer
the option to return the goods. 49 The buyer would be obligated to pay
the agreed wholesale price to the seller but would be free to fix the retail
price of "his" goods unless he had otherwise agreed by a valid retail price
maintenance contract. If buyer sold the goods, he kept the difference
between the retail and wholesale prices; if he failed to sell the goods,
he could return those which were substantially in their original condition instead of paying the wholesale price. If, despite the delivery of the goods to the
retailer, the original seller purports to retain title to the goods this is limited in
in effect under the Code to reservation of a security interest which attaches
and is perfected pursuant to the provisions of article 9.50 The notice provi45. UCC § 2-327(2)(b), Comment 4. For a brief discussion of pre-Code split of
authority see L. VOLD, supra note 37, at 383.
46. ALI & NCCUSL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: MAY 1949 DRAFT WITH COMMENTS § 2-326(1) (1949). For the origin of this text see note 18 supra.
47. 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, at 436

(1956).

48. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956, at 379-80

(1957).
49. UCC § 2-326, Comment 1 states: "The type of 'sale or return' involved herein

is a sale to a merchant whose unwillingness to buy is overcome only by the seller's engagement to take back the goods (or any commercial unit of goods) in lieu of payment

if they fail to be resold."
50. UCC § 2-401(1) provides a rule as to the reservation of title: "Any retention
or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the
buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest." This provision will
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sions of section 2-326(3) are not open to the seller in his competition for
the goods with buyer's creditors.51
Like the sale on approval, the "true" sale or return makes only rare
appearances in the court reports and Code commentaries. Businessmen
probably ignore the subtleties of the distinction made by the Code between
the sale or return and the consignment transaction. On occasion courts have
also not recognized the subtleties. Because the Code gives businessmen
freedom to contract out of most Code rules, 52 the Code distinctions may
be less important for resolving disputes between the manufacturer or
wholesaler and the retailer. But when the claims of creditors intervene,
the Code substantially curtails or conditions this freedom to contract out
of the Code rules. The legal adviser's task of planning a marketing distribution system which fully protects his client and which complies with the
law is made more difficult not only by the difficulty of distinguishing the
sale or return and the consignment but also, as outlined below, by the confusion over the rules governing the rights of consignor, consignee, and consignee's creditors.
II.

THE CONSIGNMENT

Nowhere in the Uniform Commercial Code is there a definition of
"consignment." 5 The definitional cross-reference to section 9-114 sends the
hopeful reader to the definition of "security interest" in section 1-201(37),
which has the following delphic reference to consignments: "Unless a lease
or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a
'security interest' but a consignment is in any event subject to the provisions
on consignment sales (Section 2-326)." Apparently there are (a) consignments "intended as security" which fall under article 9 by virtue of sections
1-201(37) and 9-102(2), and (b) "true" consignments not intended as
security which are regulated by section 2-326. 54
Although the distinction between "true" and "false" consignments has
practical consequences under the Code, the Code provisions give no guidelines for determining whether or not a particular consignment arrangement is
"intended as security." Commentators and a few courts have suggested
various tests, but most courts have not stopped to determine the classification
be relevant for a sale or return but not for a consignment because consignor and consignee are not "seller" or "buyer" within the definitions of id. §§ 2-103(1)(d) and (a).
Note also the definition of "sale" in id. § 2-106(1): "A 'sale' consists in the passing
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (section 2-401)."
51. See note 42 supra.
52. UCC §§ 1-102(3) and (4); see the discussion of these Code policies at notes
68-80 infra and accompanying text.
53. The definitions of "consignor" and "consignee" set out in UCC §§ 7-102(1)(b)
and (c) relate to the consignor and consignee where a bill of lading is involved.
54. Indeed, there is a third class of consignments, neither intended as security nor
falling within the scope of the first sentence of UCC § 2-326(3). For example, a consignment of goods to a person with directions to repair and store the goods would not
be within § 2-326(3). As a "transaction in goods" (id. § 2-102) a consignment in this
third class may be subject to provisions in article 2 which do not specifically refer to
a "contract for sale" (id. § 2-106(1)). The notorious "unconscionability" provision set
out in id. § 2-302, for example, may govern not only the contract for sale but also all
transactions in goods.
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of the consignment arrangement before them. As a result most reported cases
have applied the section 2-326(3) rules, and while they have fleshed out the
wording of that provision, they have not developed a test for determining
whether or not a consignment is intended as security. Uncertainty about the
scope and meaning of the Code's provisions continues.
In this part I first examine the consequences of classifying a consignment
as either "true" or "false," then analyze several proposed tests for determining the classification, and end with a survey of section 2-326(3) as
developed by court decisions.

A.

Consequences of Classifying the Consignment

If the consignment is found to be "intended as security" all the provisions
of article 9 apply. The reservation of title under such a consignment is a

security interest explicitly made subject to article 9 by section 9-102(2)
defining the scope of that article. 55 To perfect this security interest consignor
must file pursuant to part 4 of article 9. 56 Priority of the consignor's claims
to the goods will be determined in accordance with the relevant provisions of
article 957 and on default the rights and duties of consignor and consignee
will be subject to the limitations prescribed in part 5 of that article. Although
it has been suggested that language in section 1-201(37) also requires
consignor to comply with section 2-326(3), this would be of no practical
importance because that section does not add to the rights or duties of a
consignor whose consignment is intended as security. 58
55. UCC § 9-102(2) states: "This Article applies to security interests created by
contract including . .. consignment intended as security."
56. UCC § 9-401 will govern the place of filing. The consignor will normally supply "goods" (id. § 9-105(1)(f)) which will be "inventory" (id. § 9-109(4)) in the hands
of consignee. As a result, in most states filing will be in a central office. See the three
alternative subsections to id. § 9-401(1) permitted by the Code.
57. The consignment "security interest" should be found to be a "purchase money
security interest" as defined in UCC § 9-107 despite some stretching of the wording of
that section. Section 9-107 states:
A security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that
it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use
of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
The word "seller" in subsection (a) should be read to include the consignor. By determining that the consignor has parted with all but a security interest in the goods the
Code has determined that the transaction is functionally the equivalent of a sale with
a retained security interest. The more narrow definition of "seller" in id. § 2-103 (1) (d)
governs only article 2 and has not been incorporated into article 9 by reference (id. §
9-105(3)). Less persuasively, it has been suggested that consignor "gives value to
enable the debtor to acquire rights in . . . [the] collateral" but it distorts what actually
happens to say consignor does so "by making advances or incurring an obligation." As
a purchase money secured party, consignor will be subject to id. § § 9-301(2) and 9-312
(3) as well as the more general priority rule set out in id. § 9-312(5). See also note
67 infra; cf. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Penning's Sales, Inc., 5 Wash. App. 501,
487 P.2d 1053, 1057-58, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 797 (1971).
58. Comment, supra note 42, at 1211, calls attention to the phrase "a consignment
is in any event subject to the provisions on consignment sales" in UCC § 1-201(37)
(emphasis added). This comment suggests that the phrase means that all consignments
are subject to id. § 2-326(3). A better reading is to read the sentence as a whole: despite the fact that a reservation of title in a consignment not intended as security is not
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If, however, the consignment is not intended as security it will be subject
to section 2-326(3). The official text of that section states:
Where goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person
maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind
involved, under a name other than the name of the person making
delivery, then with respect to claims of creditors of the person conducting the business the goods are deemed to be on sale or return.
The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until
payment or resale or uses such words as 'on consignment' or 'on memorandum.' However, this subsection is not applicable if the person
making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's
interest or the like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling
the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured
Transactions (Article 9).
Under subsection (2) goods held on sale or return are subject to the claims
of buyer's (consignee's) creditors while in his possession. In other words, if
consignor delivers goods to a consignee who fits the description in the first
sentence of subsection (3), consignor's goods will be subject to the claims of
consignee's creditors unless the consignor meets the notoriety requirements
set out in the third sentence of that subsection.
One of the ways which consignor may protect his interests is by filing
under article 9 pursuant to section 2-326(3)(c). Whether this filing subjects
the consignment not intended as security to the non-filing provisions of
article 9 has caused concern. Clearly if consignor chooses to comply with the
filing provisions of article 9 the relevant provisions of part 4 (filing) of
article 9 will apply: the place of filing, form of statement, duration of filing,
etc., will be governed by the rules set out in that part. 59
The wording and legislative history of the Code suggest that only these
article 9 filing provisions are to apply to a "true" consignment. Section 2326(3)(c) itself refers only to the filing provisions. If a "true" consignor
files, then subsection (3) "is not applicable"; the consignment will not be
deemed a sale or return; the consigned goods will not be subject to the claims
of consignee's creditors while in his possession; pre-Code general principles
of law will govern; pursuant to these general principles consignor will
a "security interest," the consignor will be subject to § 2-326(3) with respect to the

rights of consignee's creditors and will not escape the Code altogether. In any event,
the phrase has caused the courts no trouble. See also Annot., Consignment Transactions
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 A.L.R.3d 1078, 1087 n.8 (1971).
Because a consignment intended as security is subject to the filing requirements of

article 9 (i.e., UCC § 9-302(1)), the consignor should not prevail over creditiors by complying with id. §§ 2-326(3) (a) or (b). On this point the court in In re De'Cor Wallcovering Studios, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1970), is wrong.

59. UCC § 9-408, introduced in the 1972 official text, supplements these rules by
permitting the substitution of the words "consignor" and "consignee" for "secured party"
and "debtor" in the statements filed.
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be able to reclaim "his" goods not only from consignee's unsecured creditors,
but also from his secured creditors and his trustee in bankruptcy. Legislative
history also suggests this limited reading. Section 1-201(37) was amended in
1957 to make clear that a consignment not intended as security is "not a secured transaction subject to all the filing, priority, and enforcement provisions
of Article 9."60
Several commentators, however, have suggested that other article 9 provisions should also apply to the true consignment, 61 and several courts have
adopted this suggestion, especially with respect to application of section 9301 .62 In support of this suggestion two anomalies are noted. Under section
2-326(3) the consigned goods are subject to the claims of both secured and
unsecured creditors, 63 whereas the consignor in a consignment intended as
security will prevail over unsecured creditors even though he may not have
perfected his security interest by filing. 64 Likewise, while article 9 sets out
-time limits on filing and subordinates claims based on late filing, section 2326(3) is silent. Read literally section 2-326(3) would permit the consignor,
by filing at the last moment, to snatch the consigned goods from the grasp of
creditors and even from the trustee in bankruptcy. Given that subsection (3)
was designed to protect creditors from such secret reservations, permitting

the consignor to file long after the consignee has received possession of the
goods is an undesirable result which can be avoided by applying sections 9301, 9-312 and related provisions. 65
Legislative history gives some support to the argument for application of
non-filing provisions of article 9 to the "true" consignment. Prior to 1972
commentators debated inconclusively over whether or not a "true" consignor
was required to notify a secured financer of consignee's inventory whose
agreement included an after-acquired property clause, just as a party with a
purchase money security interest would be required to do in accordance with

section 9-312(3).66 Section 9-114 has now settled this debate by accepting
the view that the filing rule in section 2-326(3)(c) not only requires filing
60. New UCC § 9-408 also states that if a consignment is filed, and is later found
to be intended as security, the filing will perfect the consignor's interest, implying that
the "true" consignment is not otherwise perfected by filing.
61. Comment, supra note 42, at 1214-15; King, Voidable Preferences and the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 925, 934-36 (1967).
62. Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d 465, 7 UCC Rep.
Serv. 650 (1970).
63. UCC § 2-326(3) refers to the term "creditors," which is defined in id. § 1-201
(12) to include both general and secured creditors. Official Comment 2 to § 2-326
speaks of "general creditors" but this comment is not binding and the text controls.
This point is recognized by the court in American Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie Homes,
Inc., 476 P.2d 573, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 281 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
64. UCC §§ 9-201 and 9-301, when read together, imply that an unperfected security interest is not subordinated to a general creditor before the latter becomes a lien
creditor as defined in § 9-301(3).
65. King, supra note 61, at 936, suggests that decisions interpreting pre-Code chattel
mortgage statutes to invalidate unfiled mortgages might apply to the analogous language
in UCC § 2-326(3). See also Duesenberg, supra note 10, at 260, for a similar suggestion. Duesenberg adds that "bearing in mind that the Code allows advanced filing, it
is not inconceivable that the time to be allowed will be zero days." Id. The suggestion,
however, ignores the alternative that many consignors will have to dispute a claim of
consignee's creditors under § 2-326(3) (b).
66. King, supra note 61, at 935; Comment, supra note 42, at 1215.
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under part 4, but also requires notice to prior inventory secured parties. 67
That the draftsmen nevertheless provide only for the inventory-secured creditor suggests, however, that this legislative history is inconclusive.
On the whole, the arguments for limiting the application of article 9 to its
part 4 filing provisions are more persuasive. Anomalous cases should be
provided for by amendments but to ignore -the Code's wording and explicit
legislative history is to create unnecessary uncertainty. If, therefore, the
consignment is not intended as security, the consignor may protect himself
from the claims of consignee's creditors by filing under article 9 without
thereby subjecting the consignment to all the provisions of that article.
Assuming the above analysis is correct, the more specific consequences of
denominating a consignment as "true" or "false" may be summarized by
looking at the relations between the parties, the rights of creditors, and the
rights of purchasers.
Relations Between the Parties. Despite its detailed provisions, the Uniform
Commercial Code reaffirms from the first the general freedom of the parties
to determine their obligations inter se. Subsections (3) and (4) of section 1102 state unambiguously: "The effect of provisions of this Act may be
varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided in this Act. .

.

. The

presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words 'unless otherwise
agreed' or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of other
provisions may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3)." The
Code encourages the growth of commercial practices within its general
framework and recognizes that this freedom to contract is an important
factor in the growth of these practices. Only with respect to very important
matters does the Code restrict this freedom. 68 The Code may restrain the
parties in order to discourage fraud and protect debtors from the superior
bargaining power of their creditors. Thus, among the restrictions are rules
requiring a written memorandum of the parties' agreement and those
provisions in part 5 of article 9 with respect to procedures on default by a
debtor in a security agreement.
While permitting the continued expansion of commercial practices, the
Code does not abolish the past. Prior law is simplified, clarified, and
modernized, but existing general principles, including the law of principal
and agent, continue to supplement the Code's provisions. 6 9 Thus, to the
67. The reasons for the 1972 adoption of new section 9-114 are set forth in ALI
& NCCUSL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-1972 OFFICIAL TEXT, and state: "An uncertainty has existed under the 19 62 Code whether the filing rule in Section 2-326(3) applicable to true consignments requires only filing under Part 4 of Article 9 or also requires

notice to prior inventory secured parties of the debtor under Section 9-312(3). The new
Section 9-114 accepts the latter view .... ." This result supports the suggestion in note
57 supra that the consignment intended as security is a "purchase money security interest" because otherwise a "true" consignment would be subject to greater restrictions than

the security consignment.
68. See, e.g., UCC § 2-718(1) with respect to liquidation or limitation of damages.
See also id. § 2-616(3) with respect to seller's excuse for non-delivery.
69. UCC §§ 1-102(2) (a), 1-103. The latter provision states: "Unless displaced by
the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law

merchant, and the law relative to
visions."

. .

. principal and agent

. . .

shall supplement its pro-
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extent that the consignment is recognized as an agency relationship these
general uncodified principles continue to govern the consignment transaction
except where displaced by Code provisions.
Within the parameters of these general policies, whether or not a consignment is classified as a secured transaction gives rise to several practical
consequences. If subject to article 9, the consignment must be evidenced by a
written memorandum and the parties may not waive certain rights and
obligations on default; if subject only to article 2, the parties are not required
to have a written agreement and are free of restrictions regarding the waiver
of rights and obligations on default.
Surprisingly, the consignment not intended as security falls outside -the
scope of the statute of frauds provisions in the Code. Section 2-326(3)
deems a consignment a sale or return only "with respect to claims of
creditors" and, therefore, the special statute of frauds provision applicable to
a contract for sale with an "or return" term does not include the consignment
within its scope. 70 Nor are the more general statute of frauds provisions
relevant. Section 2-201 covers only "a contract for sale of goods for the price
of $500 or more" and section 1-206 applies only to "a contract for the sale
of personal property." If the consignment is intended as security, however,
the parties will have to put their agreement in writing in accordance with
section 9-203 irrespective of the value of the goods and despite delivery of
71
the goods to the consignee.
A much more important difference between falling under article 9 and
article 2 lies in the remedies available to the consignee if the consignment is
found to be intended as security. Part 5 of article 9 sets out the rights and
remedies of the parties on default, and while the parties' agreement may
provide details, section 9-501(3) specifically limits the right of the parties to
vary the part 5 rules listed in that subsection. One commentator, emphasizing the "realities of the commercial world," argues that businessmen should be
permitted knowingly to waive these protective measures if the transaction is
cast in an "agency" rather than a "sale" mold. 72 The Code's policies
70. UCC § 2-326(4). This subsection states: "Any 'or return' term of a contract
for sale is to be treated as a separate contract for sale within the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) and as contradicting the sale aspect of the contract
within the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)."
71. See UCC § 9-203, Comment 5. See also In re De'Cor Wallcovering Studios,
Inc., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 59 (E.D. Wis. 1970), where the court held that an oral consignment arrangement not used by the consignor to fix prices was a consignment intended
as security which was invalid 'because § 9-203 requires a writing. Note that the 1972
amendments to § 9-203 do not amend the requirement that the security agreement be
in writing where the secured party (consignor) does not have possession of the
collateral. All commentators agree that consignor does not have "possession" of the
goods in the hands of the consignee despite the principal-agency relationship of the two
parties.
72. Duesenberg, supra note 10, at 238-39. Duesenberg argues:
So long as a transaction is not deceptive and a fraud on third parties, the
writer knows of no persuasive reason why the parties to a contract may
not willingly agree to a form of agreement which does not fall within Article 9, and therefore which avoids the unalterable remedies provisions of
that article. To be sure, those sections are designed in large part to protect the interests of the debtor for good policy reasons. But the notion
that debtors are always the ones in need of legislative protection is quickly
dispelled with exposure to the realities of the commercial world; if the
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favoring freedom of contract and growth of commercial custom cut both
ways. On the one hand, it might be argued that these policies suggest reading
narrowly the scope of mandatory provisions. On the other hand, the very
reluctance of the Code to limit this freedom itself indicates the importance
attached to these restrictions and suggests they should be read broadly to
give them full effect. Thus, one would argue that the mandatory provisions
which protect the debtor from a secured party in a superior bargaining position after default should be read broadly to protect the consignee from the
demands of the consignor when the consignor wishes to retake the goods for
any reason.

Rights of Creditors. The Code is solicitous of the rights of creditors. The
claims of creditors to goods as they move from seller to buyer is spelled out
in article 2 on sales. The legal rules governing security interests in personal
property are revised and simplified by article 9. Notice to creditors is key:

claims to goods must be publicized by public filing or by having the goods
out of the possession of the debtor. Hidden claims to goods ostensibly owned
by another by virtue of the latter's possession of the goods are subordinated
to the claims of creditors who might be misled.

Critics of the consignment under pre-Code law noted that many so-called
consignment arrangements were functionally similar to conditional sales, 73 but
whereas conditional sales had to be recorded publicly, the consignor's claims
to the goods had to be recorded in only a few states.74 The Code draftsmen
parties knowingly desire to avoid these protective measures, if due protection is afforded third parties, and if the delivering party in fact insists
on conduct under the agreement that would show an agency relationship,
little but an emotional attachment to the policy behind the -500 series of
Article 9 remains for arguing that those sections may not be avoided.
Id. at 238 n.35.
The practical difficulty of bringing the consignment arrangement within article 9 is
highlighted by the question of "default." Article 9 does not define default, leaving it
to the parties to define events of default. Standard form security agreements contain
detailed, carefully drafted clauses governing default. Consignment agreements are not
normally drafted with the same attention to "default" vocabulary.
73. Liebowitz v. Voiello, 107 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1939); NCCUSL, THE REVISED
UNIFORM SALES ACT: REPORT AND SECOND DRAFT 141 (1941); 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, 73-75 (1965).
74. G. GILMORE, supra note 73, at 74. Consignor could recover "his" goods from
consignee's trustee in bankruptcy. Ludvigh v. American Woolen Co., 231 U.S. 522
(1913). Most commentators concluded under pre-Code law that this repossession of
goods was not a voidable preference under § 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1970), because there is no "transfer" within the meaning of § 1(30) of that Act, 11
U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970). See 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 60.44 (14th ed. J. Moore & L.
King 1975). More recently, several commentators have questioned whether the Code will
change this result. Professor Kennedy suggests that repossession or "perfection" of consignor's rights is "a transfer to one [consignor] standing in the position of a creditor"
and that the critical question is "whether the owner's acquisition is rightful and legally
effective to terminate the erstwhile possessor's [consignee's] interest in the goods."
Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some
Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 518, 563 (1960). Professor King notes also that unless consignor complies with the filing provisions of UCC
§ 2-326(3)(c) prior to consignee receiving possession of the goods consignor might lose
to consignee's trustee in bankruptcy under either Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 70e, or 60,
11 U.S.C. §H 110(c), (e), or 96 (1970). King, supra note 61, at 936-38. See also
Hawkland, The Impact of the Commercial Code on the Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 67

COM. L.J. 359, 362 (1962); Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 REF. J. 37, 37-39 (1966); Shinberg, Consignment Sales in Bankruptcy,
63 CoM. L.J. 93 (1958).
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recognized this criticism and drafted section 2-326(3) to deal with "cases in
which creditors of the buyer may reasonably be deemed to have been misled
'75
by the secret reservation.
Under the Code the consignor's claims must be publicized whether or not
a consignment is found to be intended as security. If the consignment is not
intended as security, under section 2-326(3) the goods will be subject to the
claims of consignee's creditors while they are in his possession unless the
consignor (a) complies with an applicable sign law, 76 (b) establishes that
the consignee is "generally known by his creditors to be substantially
engaged in selling the goods of others," or (c) complies with the filing
provisions in article 9. Section 9-114 now also states that a "true" consignor's
interest will be subordinate to a secured party who would have a perfected
security interest in the goods if they were the property of consignee unless
the consignor (a) files before the consignee receives possession of the goods
and (b) gives written notification to the prior secured party. If a consignment is intended as security, all the provisions of article 9 apply, including
those which require the filing of a public notice and those which set out the
rules of priority. Before filing, the consignor's claims will be effective
according to the terms of the consignment agreement as between the
consignor and unsecured creditors of consignee. 77 However, because prior to
filing consignor's claims will be subordinate to lien creditors, including a
consignee's creditors will have effective
trustee in bankruptcy, in practice
78
claims to the consigned goods.
While both article 2 and article 9 require the consignor to publicize his
claims, the article 2 notoriety provisions are more primitive. The "true"
consignor is not obliged to file under article 9 but may rely instead on a sign
law or on consignee's general reputation among creditors. Moreover, section
2-326(3) sets no time limit for filing and thus raises the possibility that
consignor may avoid the claims of consignee's creditors by filing long after
the consignee received possession. Section 9-114 now protects a secured
party with an interest in consignee's inventory, but the claims of general
creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy may still be upset if section 2-326(3)
is read literally.
Transfers by Consignee to Third Parties. A basic Code policy is to protect
75. UCC § 2-326, Comment 2. The policy behind § 2-326(3) has been recognized
by the courts. As one court has said:
Regardless of how desirable this conceptualization of a consignment
contract [as an agency or bailment relationship] is from the point of view
of the consignor, it violates the principle of apparent or ostensible ownership: People should be able to deal with a debtor upon the assumption
that all property in his possession is unencumbered, unless the contrary is
indicated by their own knowledge or by public records.
Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d 465, 469, 7 UCC Rep.
Serv. 650, 655 (1970). See also language in American Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie
Homes, Inc., 476 P.2d 573, 575, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 281, 283 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
76. As explained in the text accompanying notes 99-114 inlra, the "sign law" referred to in UCC § 2-326(3)(a) means a statute providing for the consignor's interest
to be publicized. Only two states have such statutes. See In re Levy, 3 UCC Rep. Serv.
291 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
77. UCC §§ 9-201, 9-301; see note 64 supra.
78. UCC § 9-301(1)(b).
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purchasers who buy in the ordinary course of business out of inventory. 79
The purchaser from a consignee is, therefore, protected whether or not the
consignment is intended as security. Section 2-403(2) explicitly states the
principle: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in
goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business." As the official comment notes, the
consignor cannot complain about this rule because "the very purpose of
goods in inventory is to be turned into cash by sale." 80 Likewise, under
section 9-307(1) the buyer in ordinary course takes free of a security
interest even if it is perfected and even if the buyer knows of the security
interest.
B.

Finding the "True" Consignment

As the above discussion illustrates, whether or not a consignment is
intended as security does have some practical consequences under the Code.
On their face the consequences do not appear to be of great weight and some
anomalous differences may have been unintended by the draftsmen. However, given that the Code does distinguish a "true" from a "false" consignment, courts and commentators who have considered the problem have
found it necessary to elaborate on the "intended as security" language. There
is no consensus on a test, but the field has been ably surveyed from different
vantage points by Professor Hawkland and Mr. Richard Duesenberg. These
tests are easily stated. Professor Hawkland suggests the following functional
test: whether the parties use the consignment as a concession to dealers who
are unwilling to assume the risk of finding a market for the goods (a consignment intended as security) or use the device as a price-fixing arrangement
(a "true" consignment). 8 ' Duesenberg proposes that the test should be
whether or not consignor and consignee establish in word and deed that they
82
stand in relation to each other as principal and agent.
79. UCC § 2-403, Comment 2 states: "The many particular situations in which a
buyer in ordinary course of business from a dealer has been protected against reservation
of property or other hidden interest are gathered by subsection (2)-(4) into a single
principle protecting persons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory." UCC § 1-201
(9) defines "buyer in ordinary course of business."
80. Id.
81. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part 5: Consignments and Equipment Leases, 77 CoM. L.J. 108 (1972); Hawkland, Consignments
under the Uniform Commercial Code: Sales or Security?, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CO-ORDINATOR ANN. 395 (1963); Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 COM. L.J. 146 (1962). Note the similarity of Hawkland's test
with the reason given for including the "sale or return" in UCC § 2-326, Comment 1.
82. R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 36, § 11.03[2]; Duesenberg, supra note

9; Duesenberg, supra note 10. A former law professor, Mr. Duesenberg is now in private practice. This different perspective is no doubt important. One very practical consequence of the Hawkland test is that price-fixing consignment marketing schemes,
which are the only consignments subject to UCC § 2-326 according to Hawkland, run
into antitrust prohibitions. See cases cited supra note 10. At the same time, consignments intended as security are in effect "sales with reservation of a security interest"
and if consignor reserves power to fix retail prices there is an even clearer violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The net result of the Hawkland Code interpretation would be to prohibit virtually all consignment marketing operations. This fear may underlie many of Duesenberg's objections to Hawkland's analysis
and Duesenberg's emphasis on "agency."

The Supreme Court may still permit an agency consignment if used not solely to per-
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Professor Hawkland relies heavily on legislative history for his test. He
notes that initially section 1-201(37) made all consignments "security
interests." 83 The provision had to be changed because "the price-fixing
consignment is patently not a security transaction and obviously would not fit
easily, if at all, under some of the provisions of Article 9."84 The 1957
amendment to section 1-201(37) was introduced to "make it clear that a
true consignment . . .is not a secured transaction subject to all the filing,
5
priority and enforcement provisions of Article 9." 18
Professor Hawkland
notes that:
Clarity would have been promoted if the draftsmen had used language other than 'true consignment,' but the context and the sense
of the statement suggest that 'price-fixing consignment' was thereby
intended. Such language is often employed in this way, and the pricefixing consignment is the only one which logically should not be 'sub86
ject to all the filing, priority and enforcement provisions of Article 9.'
Despite criticism of this functional test, Professor Hawkland has continued to
espouse it with the added support of several important court decisions which
s
have adopted the test. 7
Duesenberg questions the source and rationale of Hawkland's test. 88 A
consignment (agency, bailment) relationship may be set up not only to
permit consignor to fix prices but also, for example, to control the quality of
marketing and after-sale services offered by the consignee. ,Hefinds nothing
mit consignor to fix prices. Mr. Justice Fortas in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1967), emphasizes the distinction between "sale" and
"agency":
We conclude that the proper application of § 1 of the Sherman Act to this
problem requires differentiation between the situation where the manufacturer parts with title, dominion, or risk with respect to the article, and
where he completely retains ownership and risk of loss.
if' te manufacturer parts with dominion over his product or transfers
risk of loss to another he may not reserve control over its destiny or the
conditions of its resale.
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in part and dissenting in part, sounds a note of caution:
[T]he Court's answer makes everything turn on whether the arrangement
between a manufacturer and his distributor is denominated a 'sale' or
'agency.' Such a rule ignores and conceals the 'economic and business
stuff out of which' a sound answer should be fashioned. . . . Draftsmen
may cast business arrangements in different legal molds for purposes of
commercial law, but these arrangements may operate identically in terms
of economic function and competitive effect. It is the latter factors which
are the concern of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 393.
83. Hawkland, Consignments Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Sales or
Security?, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CO-ORDINATOR ANN. 395, 404-05 (1963).
84. Id.
85. ALI & NCCUSL, SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TExT
AND COMMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37) (Jan. 1955); see
note 30 supra.

86. Hawkland, supra note 83, at 405.
87. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part5: Con-

signments and Equipment Leases, 77 CoM. L.J. 108, 110 (1972).

88. All Duesenberg's writings on consignments cited supra note 82 address themselves specifically to the Hawkland test. See especially Duesenberg supra, note 9, where
Duesenberg is highly critical of the decision in Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 46 Wis.
2d 550, 175 N.W.2d 465, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 650 (1970), where the court applied the
Hawkland test.
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in the Code wording or legislative history which indicates that price-fixing
rather than agency relations in general were excluded from the scope of
article 9 by the 1957 amendments. Duesenberg points out that many of the
article 9 provisions, especially the default rules in part 5, are written for the
debtor whose "indebtedness" is secured rather than for the consignee-agent
who by definition is not indebted for the price of the goods. On more general
policy grounds he argues that Hawkland's distinction will subject so many
consignment marketing arrangements to all of article 9's provisions that it
will discourage a legitimate marketing device worked out freely by consignor
and consignee.8 9
One advantage of the Hawkland test is its simplicity. The general agency
test suggested by Duesenberg requires not only careful drafting but also
continual policing by consignor for fear that a court, looking at the numerous
incidents of an agency relationship, will find that the consignment arrangement is no longer a true agency relationship and, therefore, subject to article
9. By focusing on one incident of the relation between the parties the test
proposed by Hawkland allows the parties to determine from the beginning
whether their marketing arrangement will be subject to articles 2 or 9.
A test proposed by Professor Gilmore may resolve some of the conflicting
considerations raised by Hawkland and Duesenberg. 90 Professor Gilmore
suggests that the distinction should turn on whether or not the consignee has
the right to return unsold goods. If the consignee is absolutely liable for the
price of the "consigned" goods, with no right to return the goods unsold, then
the consignor's reserved claim to the goods should be treated as a security
interest subject to all the provisions of article 9; otherwise the relevant article
2 provisions should apply. In any case, he rejects a distinction based on the
subjective intent of the parties. 91 The Gilmore test, based on the obligation to
pay the price with no right to return the goods, conforms more closely to previous usage in doctrine and case law than does the distinction suggested by
Hawkland, 92 and this test is nearly as simple as that of Hawkland.
Moreover, Gilmore would exclude most consignments from article 9 provisions rather than the reverse, which is what Duesenberg fears the Hawkland
89. Duesenberg, supra note 10, at 237-40.

Duesenberg also points out that the

parties will be able to bring all consignments within UCC § 2-326 merely by including
pro forma a price fixing clause if Hawkland's test is accepted.

90. GILMORE, supra note 73, at 337-40.
91. Id. at 338:
It is clear enough that 'intended' in the provision [sec. 1-201(37)] just
quoted has nothing to do with the subjective intention of the parties, or
either of them.

Under the pre-Code case law on consignments, the divid-

ing line between 'true' and 'false' was drawn with reference to the consignee's right to return unsold goods to the consignor: if he had that right,
the transaction was a true consignment; if he became absolutely liable for
the price of goods 'consigned' with no right to return unsold goods, the

transaction was treated as a security transaction of some sort. The same
result will follow under the Code.

92. Most discussion of pre-Code distinctions between a consignment and a sale focus

on the obligation to pay the price rather than the right to return the goods, although

the latter is also necessary for there not to be a sale. S. WILuSTON, supra note 37, § 338
at 307-08. Professor Williston states: "inn the conditional sale, but not in a bailment,
the person to whom the goods are delivered enters into an absolute obligation to buy
them and pay the price, and, therefore, acquires an immediate property in them subject
to the seller's security title."
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test would do. Certainly the Gilmore distinction would subject all valid
agency relationships to article 2 rather than article 9, and indeed, may go
even further than Duesenberg suggests because it would not distinguish the
"sale or return" from the agency consignment.9 3 Section 2-326, however,
does not lend itself to such a broad interpretation because it distinguishes the
"sale or return" from a transaction "deemed" a sale or return, and only in
the case of the latter does section 2-326 provide for publicity and avoidance
of the claims of creditors.
Since the Gilmore test strains the construction of section 2-326, one might
recast the distinction between "true" and "false" consignment arrangements
to focus on whether or not there is an obligation to pay the price of the
goods to the consignor at the time of the consignment rather than on the right
to return the goods. In the sale or return the buyer is obligated from the time
of delivery to pay the agreed price, but in lieu of doing so he may return the
goods; if the seller gives credit to the buyer and wishes to secure payment, he
should be subject to all the provisions of article 9. If a consignee, however, is
not obligated to pay the price of the goods until sale and can return unsold
goods, then under this proposed test the consignment would not be intended
as security. As to other incidents of the transaction, such as who is to bear
the risk of loss, the parties would be free to allocate this cost without worry
as to whether a court will later declare the consignment to be intended as
security. 94 This standard is both simple and consistent with pre-Code case
law. If a distinction between "true" and "false" consignments is to be made,
the Code should spell out a test for distinguishing the two, and while the test
proposed is rough and ready, it does resolve some of the dilemmas posed by
Hawkland and Duesenberg.
C. Consignments Under Article 2
Pre-Code consignments were agency or bailment relationships. The transfer of goods from consignor (principal) to consignee (agent) was not
pursuant to a contract for sale between these parties: Consignor retained title
until consignee sold the goods to a customer, at which time title passed
directly from consignor to the customer. Yet an early draft Code text,
consignment transactions, spoke of "buyer,"
designed to clarify the status of
"seller," "sale," and "resale." 9 5 Noting this anomaly, the New York Law
Revision Commission carefully redrafted the text to refer to the neutral
"person making delivery" and "person conducting the business." 96 Nevertheless, the official text continues to have anomalies. The caption to section 293. Under the interpretation set out in the text accompanying notes 41-52 supra,
the buyer in a contract for "sale or return" would be obligated to pay the agreed price
on delivery by seller but would have the option to return the goods. To secure this obligation seller must file under article 9 (UCC §§ 2-401 (1 ); 9-102; 9-302(1 ) ).
94. One might, however, run into difficulty under the antitrust law where the consignor uses the consignment to fix retail prices. See the discussion of recent Supreme
Court decisions set out in notes 10 and 82 supra.
95. ALI, UNIFORM REvisED SALES AcT (SALES CHAPTER OF PROPOSED COMMERCIAL
CODE): PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 1, § 51(2) (April 27, 1944); see note 17 supra.
96. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956, at 380
(1957); see note 29 supra.
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326 states that the section covers "consignment sales" (emphasis added); a
similar reference to "consignment sales" appears in section 1-201(37);
paragraph 2 of the official comment to section 2-326, which is unchanged
despite redrafting of the text itself, continues to refer to "seller" and "buyer."
Nor did the New York Commission text completely avoid the language of
"sale": in the second sentence of section 2-326(3) the text refers to
"payment or resale." 9 7
Given the pre-Code law and the legislative history of the Code provisions,
it is highly unlikely that the consignment has been transformed into a
contract for sale despite the anomalous wording of both Code text and
comments. The scope of article 2, according to section 2-102, covers
"transactions" in goods unless the context otherwise requires. A "transaction"
is a broader category than a "contract for sale." A consignment may be a
transaction, and, therefore, subject to article 2, but not a contract for sale.
Most sections of article 2 are limited specifically by their wording to the contract for sale, although some important provisions, such as the rules on the
good faith purchaser and the prohibition against unconscionable contracts or
clauses, are not so limited and will apply to the consignment together with the
supplementary general principles of law preserved by section 1-103. Section
2-326(3) only regulates the consignment with respect to claims of consignee's creditors. General principles of agency law will govern the rights and
98
obligations between the parties.
The Code amends these general principles of agency law by subjecting
consignor's goods to the claims of consignee's creditors, but it permits the
consignor to avoid section 2-326(3) by publicizing their relationship. In
addition, the parties may avoid subsection (3) by showing that the consignee
does not fall within the description set out in the first sentence of that
subsection.
Description of Consignee. To bring the transaction within section 2-326(3)
consignor must deliver goods to a person "for sale"; this person must
"maintain a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind
involved"; and the person must maintain this place of business "under a
97. Consignor in General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199
N.E.2d 326, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 184 (1964), argued unsuccessfully that the word "resale"

in the second sentence of UCC § 2-326(3) indicated that that section did not apply to
consignments. The court said that the second sentence merely gives examples of the
transactions to which subsection (3) applies and does not limit the plain meaning of

the non-sale language in the first sentence of that subsection.
98. As between consignor and consignee, consignor has the power to reclaim goods

at any time. Of course, if he does so in contravention of his agreement with consignee

he may have to pay damages, and in any case the claims of consignee's creditors may
intervene by virtue of UCC § 2-326. The consignor as principal also retains the right
to fix the retail price of his goods while they are in the hands of the consignee, and
if consignor fails to do so consignee is obligated to charge a reasonable price. Moneys
received by the consignee as proceeds from the sale of the goods are held for the consignor to whom consignee must account for the full retail price less a sales commission.
Consignee as agent also has the power to return the unsold goods although he may be
liable for breach of the agency agreement or for damage to the returned goods while
they were in his care. For general pre-Code law governing the factor or commission
agent see F.
See also F.

50 (1901).
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name other than the name of the person making delivery." Merchants who
sell from inventory in their own name are covered; creditors who finance
these merchants' inventory are to be protected from cases where the
merchants have ostensible ownership of the goods by taking delivery without
taking "title."
An owner of goods, whether a merchant or non-merchant, may deliver
them to a person for reasons other than sale. Thus, if goods are delivered to
a consignee for repair and storage, with no authority to sell the goods, section
2-326(3) does not apply. If goods are delivered with directions both to
repair and to sell them, however, the same subsection will apply. 99 In an
important early Code case a consignee who primarily distributed goods to
other retailers but who also sold some of the goods was found to be within
the scope of subsection (3).100 Another court has stated that even if the
consignee had no authority to sell goods and merely delivered goods to other
retailers for sale, the court would still subject the goods to the claims of
consignee's creditors in order to carry out the policy of section 2-326 unless
consignor met the publicity requirements set out in subsection (3).101 Where
a supplier "consigned" goods to a subcontractor in financial difficulties who
used the goods for its jobs and charged a lump sum for both services and
goods, the court brushed aside the suggestion that the goods consigned were
not consigned for sale, noting that the cost of the goods represented a
1 2
distinct, identifiable part of the price charged by the subcontractor.
The courts have read broadly the requirement that the goods be delivered
for sale. The test itself is unfortunate in that it turns on the express authority
given consignee by consignor, about which third parties will not know unless
they inquire, whereas the other tests (dealing in similar goods, under a name
other than consignor's) are ones which will be readily apparent to creditors.
Purchasers in the ordinary course of business from the consignee are
99. Consignor in In re International Mobile Homes, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1150 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974), argued that it had consigned repossessed mobile homes for repair and
storage, giving consignee no authority to sell. The court found no evidence to support
this argument but implied that if there had been proof of limited authority in consignee

the transaction would not be subject to UCC § 2-326(3). A similar argument was ad-

vanced in Blowers v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Ala. App. 485, 232 So. 2d 666, 7 UCC Rep.

Serv. 668 (1970). Consignor, a car rental agency, argued that it had left the vehicles
in dispute with the consignee for repairs. The Alabama court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that there had been a consignment for sale. In American Nat'l Bank v. Etter, 28 Colo. App. 511, 476 P.2d 287, 8
UCC Rep. Serv. 298 (1970), the court found that the repairs were only incidental to
resale. See also American Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 28 Colo. App. 477,
476 P.2d 573, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 281 (1970).
Should the casual non-merchant who leaves his car at the corner service station to
see if a mechanic can sell the car be subject to § 2-326(3)? Without elaboration the
court in Allgeier v. Campisi, 117 Ga. App. 105, 159 S.E.2d 458, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 93
(1968), protected the non-merchant consignor by finding that consignee was authorized
only to solicit offers to purchase and not to sell. The case is noted in 7 AM. Bus. L.J.
304 (1969).
100. General Elec. Co. v. Pettingell Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199 N.E.2d 326, 2
UCC Rep. Serv. 184 (1964), noted in 65 COLUM. L. REv. 547 (1965); 44 TExAs L.
REV. 806 (1966); 22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91 (1965).
101. In re Novak, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 196 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1969). The court's position
is foreshadowed by the same suggestion in 65 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 549-50 (1965).
102. Vonins, Inc. v. Raff, 101 N.J. Super. 172, 243 A.2d 836, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 433
(1968).
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protected by section 2-403(2). Creditors, on the other hand, will have to
inquire into the authority of the consignee with respect to goods in his
possession in order to protect themselves fully even if the notoriety provisions
in subsection (3) are met.
Consignee must maintain a place of business at which he deals in goods of
the kind involved in order to fall within the scope of section 2-326(3).10a In
an early leading case, consignee had goods marked with its name and forwarded directly to department stores whose employees sold them. Consignee
received a commission for arranging these retail outlets. The New York
courts found that consignee did not maintain a place of business at which it
dealt in these goods. 10 4 That the consignee "deals" in the goods without
necessarily selling them at his place of business brings within the scope of
subsection (3) more than the retail merchant. Thus, a court has found that a
transaction involving a subcontractor who maintained a place of business
but did not make retail sales from this office to be within subsection (3).105
Similarly, "goods of the kind involved" is an elastic term. A retailer of floor
coverings who took a consignment of expensive oriental rugs was found to be
dealing in similar goods (floor coverings) without inquiring whether or not
creditors would be misled.' 06
Finally, consignee must maintain a place of business at which he deals in
goods of the kind involved "under a name other than the name of the
[consignor]." There is ambiguity as to whether this clause modifies "maintaining the business" or "dealing": i.e., must consignor's name appear over
the door or on all business papers, or both? The policy of protecting creditors
from relying on ostensible ownership suggests that for consignee to fall
outside section 2-326(3) all indications should warn of the consignment
arrangement. However, in response to an oil company's argument based on
the fact 'that the company's trade name appeared prominently outside a service station at which the company "consigned" gasoline, a court in a recent
decision noted that the name of the service station "dealer" also appeared
103. UCC § 2-326(3) uses both "maintain" a place of business and "conduct" the
business. No one has questioned that the person who maintains a place of business is
the same person who conducts the business, but in an appropriate case a distinction

might be made.
104. In re Mincow Bag Co., 53 Misc. 2d 599, 279 N.Y.S.2d 306, 4 UCC Rep.Serv.
197 (Sup.
60 (1968),
Rep. Serv.
consignee's

Ct. 1967), affd, 29 App. Div. 2d 400, 288 N.Y.S.2d 364, 5 UCC Rep. Serv.
aff'd per curiam, 24 N.Y.2d 776, 248 N.E.2d 26, 300 N.Y.S.2d 115, 6 UCC
112 (1969). A well-argued dissent in the appellate division suggests that
creditors would have understood that the department stores were places at

which consignee dealt. "Ingenuity can devise any number of variations of the consignment or sale or return agreement which take the transaction out of the letter of the law,
but not out of its spirit .

. .

. It is the latter that should control interpretation."

29

App. Div. 2d at 403, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 367, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. at 62. Certainly the decision permits consignor and consignee to avoid the claims of consignee's creditors under
UCC § 2-326 by having shipper deliver directly to consignee's customers. The language
of § 2-326(2) and (3) appear, however, to compel the majority's decision. Under subsection (2) the goods are only subject to consignee's creditors' claims while the goods
are in his "possession."
105. Vonins, Inc. v. Raff, 101 N.J. Super. 172, 243 A.2d 836, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 433
(1968).
106. In re Fabers, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 126 (D. Conn. 1972).
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over the door and that creditors might rely on this indication that the dealer
07
was the real owner of the gasoline.
Courts generally have had little difficulty rejecting arguments that consignee or "person taking delivery" was not within the definition of the first
sentence of section 2-326(3). At least one court has stated that its broad
interpretation was based on the policy of protecting creditors from relying on
the apparent ownership of the consignee.' 0 8 At the same time, too broad an
interpretation may vitiate inoffensive distribution techniques used by consignors who will not consider the consignment as within the sales or the secured
transaction provisions of the Code. For example, a wholesaler may wish
to give consignee no power to sell but to use him as an independent
distributor to specific retailers because consignee has warehouse and shipping
facilities in a strategic location. The thrust of the decisions would include this
distribution technique but not one where consignee never had possession of
the goods, having arranged with manufacturer to send them directly to
retailers.
Sign Law. Consignor may take the arrangement out of the provisions of
section 2-326(3) by complying "with an applicable law providing for a
consignor's interest or the like to be evidence by a sign" as provided in
section 2-326(3)(a). The draftsmen apparently contemplated the so-called
"Traders' Acts" of which the Virginia statute was most well-known. 10 9 Only
North Carolina and Mississippi, however, continue to have these Acts on
their statute books.' 10 West Virginia repealed its provision with the enactment of the Code in 1963, and Virginia finally repealed its provision in
1973.111
One might conclude that the sign law "way out" for the consignor is a
virtual dead letter. Several courts have implied, however, that subsection
(3)(a) refers not only to statutory law but also to common law, and even
that the provision permits labels on the goods indicating consignor's claims to
take the consigned goods from the reach of consignee's creditors. After
noting that New Jersey has no sign statute, a New Jersey court went on,
however, to note that consignor had not even placed a sign on the consigned
merchandise indicating his claim." 2 More recently, a federal court in
Arizona noted that that state had neither statute nor court rule permitting
consignor to protect his interest by a sign and that in any case consignor had
107. Mann v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 302 F. Supp. 1376, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 1253
(E.D. Mo. 1969), af!'d per curiam, 425 F.2d 736, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 695 (8th Cir.
1970).
108. After initial hesitation, the Pennsylvania courts ruled that the reference was to
a statute and most later courts have agreed. In re Downtown Drug Store, Inc., 3 UCC
Rep. Serv. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1965); In re Levy, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 291, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
("The phrase 'an applicable law' as used in Section 2-326(3)(a) of the Code means a
statute.").
109. See VA. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 55-152 (repealed 1973).
110. N.C. COMM. & Bus. CODE § 66-72 (1975); MIss. CODE ANN. § 15-3-7 (1972).
111. W. VA. CODE ANN. ch. 47, § 47-8-1 (repealed 1963); VA. CoDE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 55-152 (repealed 1973).
112. Vonins, Inc. v. Raff, 101 N.J. Super. 172, 243 A.2d 836, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 433
(1968).
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not labeled his goods. 118 If these decisions are followed, however, creditors
would be required actively to police their debtors and the goods on their
premises. The creditors could not rely on the absence of notice in a public
file or on the general reputation of their debtor. Doubt as to how explicit the
label would have to be also suggests that the rights of parties would always
be uncertain.
Subsection (3)(a) has outlived its usefulness and remains only to confuse.
One reason filing under article 9 was introduced in subsection (3)(c) was 1 to
14
enact a sign law for states which did not already have a Traders' Act.
Only two states continue to have such statutes. California decided not to
include the provision when it enacted section 2-326. If the consignment rules
are revised this subsection should be discarded.
Consignee Known To Deal in Consigned Goods. Consignor may also avoid
section 2-326(3) by establishing that consignee is "generally known by his
creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others" (section
2-326(3)(,b). The hope this provision offers is illusory. In all but one of
the reported cases, consignors who have relied on it in order to avoid the
claims of consignee's creditors have failed. Perhaps success in an early case
raised consignors' hopes. Consignee operated a furniture cleaning enterprise
and sold new and used furniture as well. A non-merchant consumer left used
furniture with consignee to sell. A window sign advertised both used and new
furniture and the court held that this sign, coupled with the absence of any
new furniture on the premises, gave notice that consignee dealt in the goods
of others. 1 5'
Consignors in subsequent cases have put on progressively more elaborate
cases. A lower court decision which found in a series of related cases that
debtor-consignee was generally known by his creditors to sell goods on
consignment was overruled on the ground that there was insufficient evidence.' 1 6 In an earlier case another court had ruled that evidence showing
that ten trade creditors knew of the consignment was insufficient given that
fifty-five to sixty general creditors did not know. 117 A general newspaper
advertisement announcing the arrival of a consignment of oriental rugs was
held inadequate, and evidence that oriental rug dealers always dealt "on
consignment" was found insufficient to show that creditors of the consignee
knew of the consignment in that case. The same court also found as a fact
that the consignee was not substantially engaged in selling the goods of
others."18 A more recent decision sets out an elaborate analysis of subsection
(3)(b). After citing dictionary definitions of "generally" and "substantially,"
113. Interstate Tire Co. v. United States, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 948 (D. Ariz. 1973).
114.

Hearing,supra note 1, at 193.

115. In re Griffin, I UCC Rep. Serv. 492 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
116. American Nat'l Bank v. Christensen, 28 Colo. App. 501, 476 P.2d 281, 8 UCC
Rep. Serv. 294 (1970); American Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 28 Colo. App. 486,
476 P.2d 304, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 287 (1970); American Nat'l Bank v. Tina Marie
Homes, Inc., 28 Colo. App. 477, 476 P.2d 573, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 281 (1970); American

Nat'l Bank v. Etter, 328 Colo. App. 511, 476 P.2d 287, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 298 (1970).
117. Vonins, Inc. v. Raft, 101 N.J. Super. 172, 243 A.2d 836, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 433
(1968).

118. In re Fabers, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 126 (D. Conn. 1972).
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the court said that consignor must show that "most of the bankrupt's
(consignee's) creditors knew that a considerable amount of the bankrupt's
business was selling the goods of others." Although seventy-six unsecured
and eight secured creditors had been scheduled, testimony showed that only
fifteen creditors knew that consignee was selling the goods of others. In
response to the argument that the fifteen creditors represented over one-half
of the total scheduled claims, the court noted that section 2-326(3) "clearly
does not speak of the amount of indebtedness but -to 'creditors.'" The court
also noted bankrupt's testimony that consignor's goods represented only "a
very small portion of business."' 119 In another bankruptcy proceeding, a
consignor seeking to reclaim goods from his bankrupt consignee's assignee
presented the testimony of a series of officials from local bank and credit
institutions. After reviewing the testimony the court noted that although most
witnesses were familiar with bankrupt's manner of doing business, they
neither represented creditors of bankrupt nor had they spoken with bankrupt's creditors about his business. Of the fifteen unsecured and three
secured creditors scheduled only two testified about their knowledge of
bankrupt's business methods and the court found this insufficient to meet the
0

12
test of section 2-326(3)(b).

Section 2-326(3)(b) is a remedial device rather than a planning provision. No merchant consignor with the alternative of either filing under article
9 pursuant to section 2-326(3)(c) or relying on subsection (3)(b) would
choose the latter. Even if at the time of the consignment consignee was
generally known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling
consigned goods, consignee's business might change and his creditors turn
over. Potential creditors will be in a similar dilemma because they will have
to decide whether or not consignee meets the same test and they will have to
police their debtor to ensure that he does not change the conduct of his
business. On the other hand, a non-merchant consignor, who is unlikely to
know about filing under article 9 or to understand that "his" goods may be
taken by consignee's creditors, may be able to prevail under subsection
(3)(b). Given the inherent uncertainty embodied in the flexible wording of
subsection (3)(b) and the difficulty of meeting the test, perhaps it should be
abandoned, at least with respect to merchant consignors. Merchants are now
familiar with the simple and uniform filing scheme provided under article 9
and the burden of filing is not great.
Filing Under Article 9. If consignor "complies with the filing provision of
[Article 9]" section 2-326(3)(c) provides that his goods in the hands of
consignee will not be subject to the claims of consignee's creditors.
Despite its apparent innocuousness this provision does raise several
119. In re Webb, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 394 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
120. In re International Mobile Homes, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1150 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
None of the court decisions has made anything of the use of the word "known" in UCC
§ 2-326(3)(b). Id. § 1-201(25) notes that "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a
fact when he has actual knowledge of it." Consignor apparently must produce evidence of actual knowledge by a majority of consignee's creditors, although the adjective
"generally" may suggest a less rigorous standard (i.e., than the context otherwise requires).
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problems. Two have already been discussed: the absence of a time limit for
filing and the applicability of article 9 non-filing provisions to a "true"
consignment.' 2 ' A third problem is whether a "true" consignor is ever
requiredto file under article 9.
Section 2-326(3) offers consignor several options if he wishes to free his
goods from the claims of consignee's creditors: he may comply with a sign
law or he may establish consignee is known as such by most of his creditors.
The first option is permitted in only two states and the second may leave
uncertain the rights of the parties; nevertheless, these options are available.
The alternative of showing notoriety, moreover, is available to the consignor
at the time creditors seek to enforce their claims against the goods so that
this option will be open to consignor even after he delivers the goods to the
consignee. Furthermore, the consignor always has the option to do nothing.
Given the wording of section 2-326(3), it comes as a surprise that the
1972 Code amendments and official comments thereto refer to the "requirement" of filing. Section 9-114(1) addresses itself to a consignor
"who would
be required to file under this Article by paragraph (3)(c) of Section 2-326."
The official comment to that section also speaks of this "requirement," as
does the reason given for 'the adoption of section 9-408. Perhaps the
draftsmen had in mind the consignor in a state with no sign law who knows
that consignee is not substantially engaged in the selling of goods of others so
that, as a practical matter, if he wishes to protect the goods from the claims
of his consignee's creditors, he will have to file. The language of the official
comment to section 9-114, however, is more sweeping and it seems to
assume most assignments will be covered by that section. As a matter of
policy it may be desirable to require all merchant consignors not only to file
under article 9 but also ito notify prior inventory secured parties. The present
Code, however, does not do the former and consequently it leaves the latter
result in doubt.
Estoppel or Related Theory. Is it still possible for consignor to prevail over a
creditor of his consignee even though consignor has not complied with section
2-326(3) notoriety provisions if consignor can show that the creditor himself
knew about the consignment arrangement? The structure of section 2-326(3)
-first subjecting all consigned goods to the claims of consignee's creditors
and then setting out specific ways of avoiding these claims-militates towards concluding that the notoriety provisions are exclusive and that an
estoppel argument should be rejected. Several consignors, however, have
made estoppel-like arguments, so far without success.
In one case consignor argued that a creditor was estopped to assert its
claim because of its method of dealing and its failure to ascertain the true
status of title. The appellate court rejected this argument, noting that "where
a legal right is clearly established, the equitable doctrine of estoppel can not
be used to circumscribe that right." The court also noted that consignee's
121. See notes 55-80 supra and accompanying text.
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creditor has22made no representation upon which consignor had relied to his
detriment.'
In another case, decided under a statute adopting the 1962 official text,
purchaser bought from bankrupt-consignee's receiver. Purchaser knew that
consignor had consigned goods to the consignee. The court found that the
receiver was a lien creditor without knowledge because there was no
allegation that all of consignee's creditors knew of consignor's arrangement
as required by section 9-3 01 (3). Receiver, therefore, prevailed over consignor
under section 9-301(1)(b) and the purchaser from the receiver stepped into
receiver's shoes without regard to purchaser's knowledge of the consignor's
marketing arrangement. While the decision relates to a special case of an
intervening receiver, the implication is that "true" consignments may be
unperfected security interests subject to section 9-301 and that consignor will
prevail over lien creditors with knowledge of his interest in the consigned
goods.' 23 On this point the court's reasoning is questionable. ,I have suggested earlier that non-filing provisions of article 9 are not applicable to the
"true" consignment. In any case, the court's construction will be unavailable
in states which have adopted the 1972 official text of the Code because that
text deletes the requirement in section 9-301(1)(b) that the person who
becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected be "without
knowledge."
III.

CONCLUSION

The "true" consignment marketing device is neither fish nor fowl. It is not
a "sale" because consignor retains extensive control over the goods, consignee is not obligated to pay a fixed price, and consignee may return the goods
at any time. Consignor does, however, give up possession of the goods with
the intention of having them sold to third parties. Yet consignor wishes to
retain control over the goods after they leave his possession. Traditionally he
has been able to do so by establishing an "agency" relationship with
consignee whereby consignor had control over the activities of the consignee
and continued claims to the goods. This control and these claims were
recognized as distinct and more extensive than the security interest retained
by seller to secure payment of the purchase price. When legislation required
security interests in personal property to be recorded in public files, merchants used the consignment as a "disguised" security device. Courts have
tried to distinguish the "true" from the "false" consignment, and after initial
the draftsmen of the Uniform
attempts to apply article 9 to all consignments,
24
Commercial Code have tried to do likewise.'
122. American Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 28 Colo. App. 486, 476 P.2d 304, 8
UCC Rep. Serv. 287 (1970).
123. Columbia Int'l Corp. v. Kempler, 46 Wis. 2d 550, 175 N.W.2d 465, 7 UCC Rep.

Serv. 650 (1970).

124. The Code draftsmen have not been alone in trying to legislate for the consignment. The Model Uniform Personal Property Security Act adopted by the Canadian

Bar Association in September 1970 tried to do likewise:

This recommendation was made because in practice it is often difficult to

distinguish between a consignment agreement or a lease which is a disguised security agreement and one which is not and because, so far as
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The Code provisions raise problems which court decisions and commentators have not yet resolved. In this Article I have suggested some solutions
and some possible amendments. On the whole, I question whether the
distinction between "true" and "false" consignments is necessary, especially
if one excludes from the scope of the Code casual non-merchant consignments. If article 9 were to govern all consignments, the freedom of the
consignor to fix the terms of his marketing arrangement would be restricted,
especially by the default provisions. But is this so dreadful? If there is to be
a distinction, however, the test for making this distinction should be defined
further by the Code. A proposed test which draws on accepted past
distinctions would be whether or not the consignee is obligated from the time
of delivery to pay the price and whether or not he may return the goods at
any time. More specifically, if section 2-326(3) is to be retained, I suggest
that paragraphs (a) and (b) be deleted and consignor be required to file
within a given time under article 9 in order to avoid the claims of consignee's
creditors. The Code's consignment provisions are due for a consistent
overhaul to eliminate anomalous cases and to clarify the rights of the parties.

third parties are concerned, it really does not matter. The possibilities for

deception are the same in both cases. However, there was some opposition to our melding security and non-security devices and, in the result,

the committee decided to refer the matter back to its successor for further
consideration.
SECURITY OVER CORPOREAL MOVADLES 104-05 (J.

Sauveplanne ed. 1974).

